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INTRODUC1'JON 
In recent decad 's, international commodity agreements have been proposed as 
a way of promoting 'development." Behrman, McNicol and others have analyzed 
them from a purely economic point of view. Fisher, Krasner, and others have 
adopted a more politi al perspective. In this article, we seek to advance the political 
analysis of such a eements. We do so by studying the allocation of export 
entitlements in the IJternational Coffee Organization (ICO). 
In the ICO, as ih other international organizations, political processes replace 
markets in the allocttion of source resources. In the case of the ICO, allocational 
decisions are made b� majority rule. Given the possibility of strategic behavior in 
such political enviroJments, game theory should provide a useful set of tools for the 
analysis of such instiI�utions. A particular interest of this article is the appropriate­ness of a specific sol tion concept--the Shapley value--to the analysis of politically 
contrived allocations lunder the IC0.1 
THE INSTITUTION2 
The Internatiotal Coffee Organization was formed under the terms of the 
International Coffee l Agreement ratified in 1962. Its members include the major 
consumer nations (which account for 95 percent of annual world consumption) and 
the major producer ations (which account for 98 percent of annual world export). 
The agreement repr sents an attempt to stabilize the coffee prices. To achieve this 
goal, the ICO impos s quota restrictions upon its members. Each producer agrees 
not to export more han his assigned quota. Adherence to the quota is enforced 
through a system o stamps and certificates. Producers which have filled their 
quotas can make f ther sales on the nonquota market; prices on that market, 
however, currently a erage less than one-half of those on the quota market. 
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Formally, decisions concerning the allocation of the quota are taken by vote. 
Consumer nations receive 1000 votes; so too do producer nations; and a two-thirds 
majority of each "house" is required to establish a binding allocation. Despite the 
rules, interviews reveal that while producer and consumer nations do negotiate the 
overall price and quantity levels, consumer nations refuse to get involved in the 
subdividing of the overall quota into national quotas. For purposes of analyzing the 
allocation of quotas, then, we may concentrate solely on the producer nations. 
THE ANALYSIS 
The data we shall analyze are the two proposals for quota allocations advanced 
after the reimposition of export restrictions in 1982. One, proposed in June, 1982, 
failed to secure adoption by the member states; another was proposed in September, 
1982, and was ratified. 
The above rules define a we,ighted majority game (see Luce and Raiffa; Riker 
and Ordeshook). Various approaches are available for predicting allocations within 
an institution possessing such a structure. A common feature of these different solu­
tion concepts is that they represent a measure of the political power of players to 
influence outcomes, given the rules of the institution. Although we agree with many 
of the criticisms offered of the Shapley value, we have calculated the Owen Approx­
imation of it and sought to determine whether it allows us to account for the alloca­
tion of the coffee quota and the votes of individual nations in 1982. Mathematically, 
for our problem, the Shapley value.for the i-th player (Sil is defined as: 
S 
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where the summation is taken over all winning coalitions (i.e., a collection of 
members for which the summation of votes exceed two-thirds of the total votes) T 
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such that T - {i} is 1°t winning. The number of members in T is t and N is the 
number of players. T�e Shapley value thus measures the ability of a player to use its 
share of votes to turd coalitions into electoral majorities. Its measure is the propor­
tion of all possible c+litions that a player can convert into winning coalitions. The 
ability of the player r be pivotal in that sense defines the player's political power. 
Consequently, the Sf pley value defines as well the share of the payoffs that each 
player can expect to get, given its ability to exploit its strategic opportunities to 
make (or to refuse to ake) coalitions into winning coalitions. It therefore suggests 
as well the allocatio al outcome of the game in terms of the payoffs that should be 
expected to go to eaci player. Table 1 exhibits the Owen approximation of Shapley 
value for each player ) along with other important data. 
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
The Votes oflndividual Nations 
In the case of!oth proposals, six nations cast negative votes. Colombia, 
Indonesia, Kenya, apua New Guinea, Tanzania, and India voted against the 
proposal of June, 19 2, while Indonesia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Peru, Papua New 
Guinea, and India vo1ed against the proposal of September, 1982. 
We are in a polition to investigate two possible explanations for the voting 
behavior of member ations of the ICO. One is that they would evaluate a proposal 
in terms of what they had been securing in the international coffee market. Another 
is that they would evf uate a proposal in terms of what they could expect to get from 
negotiations with ot er member nations. The first leads to a definition of an 
explanatory variable Z.i, where Z.; is the difference between the quota assigned in 
the proposal (q.;) an the nation's previous year's (i.e., in our problem, 1980/81) 
export share (e;). Tiat is, Z.i = q.; - e;. The second leads to the definition of an 
alternative explanaJry variable, X.;. X.; is measured in terms of the difference 
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between the quota assigned in the proposal and the nation's Shapley value (Si). That 
is, X.; =q. ; -S; . All variables are measured in percentage terms and· stands for 
either 1 or 2, that is, (1) the proposal of June 1982 which failed, or (2) the second 
proposal, made in September, which passed. 
To test these explanations of voting behavior, we adopted probit procedures. 
Specifically, let Yji be a dichotomous variable such that Yji = 1 if producer i voted for 
j proposal; Yji = 0 otherwise. The models can be stated as: 
Prob (YJi = 1) = <I> (a+ PXJi + yZJ;)
where Prob (Yji = 1) denotes
.
the probability that Yji = 1; <1>(u) denotes the cumulative 
density of a standard normal variable evaluated at u; a, p, y are scalars which we 
will estimate. In other words, the models predict that producer i voted for j proposal 
ifa + {3Xji + y Zji � 0 and otherwise voted against}. 
In these and other areas of this investigation, we have found it useful and 
necessary to treat the Colombian milds--Kenya, Tanzania, and Colombia--as a bloc. 
More specifically, the data suggest and interviews confirm that the three nations 
act as a bloc led by Colombia, wherein Colombia evaluates proposals in terms of 
their effect on its own quota, whereas Kenya and Tanzania evaluate the proposals 
in terms of their impact on the share of Colombian milds in the allocation as a 
whole.3 In the models that follow, we therefore replace Xji and Zji by .J0; and Zji,
where Xji = Xji if it{Kenya, Tanzania}; Xji =the summation of Xji over ie{Colombia, 
Kenya, Tanzania} if i is Kenya or Tanzania. A similar definition applies to ZJi·
With these modifications, the results of these estimations are:4 
The Proposal That Fa�led 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Prob (Y1i= ll=<t> (1.2348 +3.5834 Xlil 
(0.5903) (3.0535) 
log-likelihood= -4.4115 
Prob (Yli=ll=<j>(l.3402+1.9128 Zli) 
(1.0134) (0.5671) 
log-likelihood= -3.4103 
rob(Yli=ll=cf>(l.3125+0.4353 X1i + 1.6752 Zli) 
(0.5710) (1.3332) (2.0525) 
log-likelihood= -3.3738 I The Successful Propo�al 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Prob(Y2i=l)=<j>(0.6 +0.1837 X2;l 
(0.3207) (0.2212) 
log-likelihood= -11.8122 
Prob (Y2;= ll=<!> (1.0951 +6.3769 Z2i) 
(0.5863) (2.8622) 
log-likelihood= -2.2835 
Prob(Y2i=ll=<!>(l.2671-0.1591 x2i+6.5049 Z2;l 
(0.7933) (0.5981) (3.0281) 
log-likelihood= -1.90355 
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Except in equation (6), all the coefficients associated with Xji and Zji have the 
expected positive sign. That is, if a proposal assigned an individual nation a 
quota larger than its Shapley value or its previous year's export share, the nation 
was more likely to vote for that proposal. 
Upon calculating the t-statistics (the numbers within the parentheses 
denote standard deviations), we find that all the constant terms are significant at 
90 percent confidence level. None of the coefficients associated with �i is 
significant at 80 percent confidence level. The coefficients associated with �i 
differ across the equations: they are significant at the 95 percent confidence level 
for equations (5) and (6); at the 90 percent confidence level in equation (2); and 
insignificant for equation (3). 
These results may be interpreted as indicating: 
6 
1. There is a general tendency to vote for proposals. Interviews suggest that 
the origins Gf this tendency lie in a fear that without an agreement on quotas, the 
regulation of the international market will break down. Each nation would then be 
faced with unrestricted competition. 
2. The Shapley value is not a significant determinant of the voting behavior 
of individual nations. 
3. Consideration of the impact of a quota proposal upon existing market 
shares is a significant determinant of an individual nation's voting behavior 
(although the results are not as clear-cut as one would like in the case of votes on the 
proposal that failed). 
The Allocation of the Quota 
Given the failure of "Shapley entitlements" to determine voting decisions by 
individual nations, it is paradoxical to discover that the final allocation of the quota 
tended to conform to the Shapley value. 
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The rules of thf organization allocate indicative quotas--that is, claims as to 
what a nation's quo might justifiably be. Under the rules prevailing in 1982 
(specifically, Article 30), nations could base claims for quotas on their average 
exports for the perio 1968/69 to 1971172 or for the period 1976177 to 1979/80. The 
rules also allocate voJes. Under Article 13, votes were apportioned on the basis of the 
average volume of eJports to importing members over the previous four years (i.e., 
1976177 to 1979/80). 
These rules can lbe modeled and estimated as a system of equations: 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
W;=0. 13783+0.9242 P1i 
(010161) (0.0021) 
S;=0.8�27 Wi + 0.0156 W� 
(O.Oi1J31) (0.0018) 
q1;=0.1354 f 0.9410P2i+ 0.0322Si 
(0.1232)1(0.0684) (0.0758) 
q2;= -0.22791+0.8281 P2i+ 0.2175 Si 
(o.12H> (0.0674) (0.0746) 
By Article 13 
By assumption of rational behavior 
By Article 30 and prediction 
By Article 30 and prediction 
where W; is the prop rtion of votes held by voter i; P1; is producer i's average export 
share from 1976/77 1979/80; P2; is the maximum of producer i's average export 
share for the period 1 68/69 to 1971172 or for the period from 1976177 to 1979/80. All 
the variables are me sured in percentages. The system was estimated by two-stage 
least squares, using the constant term, P1• and P2• as instrumental variables, to 
eliminate the relati nship between Si and qli ; q2i that was indirectly produced 
through their associa ion with export performance. 
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As shown in equations (9) and (10), the coefficient of the Shapley value is 
insignificant in the case of the quota that failed; but it is significant in the case of the 
quota that passed. In other words, the proposal that accommodated the strategic 
power as measured by the Shapley value succeeded while the proposal that did not 
failed. 
CONCLUSION 
We thus encounter a paradox. Consideration of the Shapley value does not 
appear to influence a nation's votes on a proposed quota. But proposed quotas pass 
when they conform to the Shapley value and fail when they do not. 
The resolution of this paradox may lie in the following: In the ICO, a proposal 
is first negotiated, then proposed, and then voted upon. It is during the period of 
negotiations that each nation attempts fully to exploit its political power in order to 
improve upon its export position. It is thus in the process of negotiations, rather 
than at the time of voting, that the strategic power as measured by the Shapley 
value may have its effect upon the allocational process in the commodity agreement. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
(1 ') 
(2') 
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NOTES 
As discussed in 'iker and Ordeshook and elsewhere, the Shapley value makes 
several assumptlons that are not intuitively appealing. Unlike many other 
solution concept , however, it does possess an algorithm which allows it to be 
calculated even lwhen the number of players is large. We have therefore 
employed it to xplore the impact of the political rules of the commodity 
agreement upon he voting behavior of its members and the allocation of export 
entitlements. 
This discussion is taken from Bates and Lien. See also Krasner and Fisher. 
Bates served as a technical advisor to the 1985 meetings of the ICO and made 
extensive observ�tions during the negotiations. 
We employed baximum likelihood estimation and the model selection 
criteria propost by Akaike. The Akaike criteria were imposed here to select 
the explanator variables (i.e. Xji and Zji over Xji and Z). The estimation 
results with XJi nd ZJi being explanatory variables are as follows: 
Prob (Yli= ll=<!> (0.6074+1.7778 Xii) 
(0.3571) (1.4983) 
log-likelihood= -8.1767 
Prob (Y Ii= O=<!> (0.6806+1.3552 Z1il 
(0.3710) (0.6964) 
log-likelihood= -7.4169 
(3 ') 
(4 ') 
(5') 
(6') 
Prob(Yli=l)=<j>(0.6586+0.4320 Xii+ 1.1218 Zli) 
(0.3793) (1.3521) (0.9421) 
log-likelihood= -7.3482 
Prob (Y2;
= ll=<I> (0.6513 +0.4769 X2il 
(0.3370) (0.3471) 
log-likelihood= -10.8518 
Prob(Y2;=1l=<j>(4.6040 + 16.0237 Z2i) 
(4.8099) (15.4748) 
log-likelihood= -2.6297 
Prob(Y2;=ll=<jl(-0.4679 X2;+ 3.9399 Z2;l 
(0.5630) (1.6029) 
log-likelihood= -7.0644 
10 
Comparing the log-likelihood for equations (1 ')-(6 ') to that of equations (1)-(6) 
respectively, we find that xji and zji are better explanatory variables than xji and 
z1;· 
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TABLE 1. The data 
Shapley Value Successful 
Nation (96) Proposal (96) 
Brazil 25.35 30.83 
Colombia 18.72 16.28 
OAMCAF 11.01 11.96 
Indonesia 7.48 4.55a 
El Salvador 4.81 4.48 
Mexico 3.95 3.65 
Guatemala 3.81 3.47 
Uganda 3.53 4.44 
Costa Rica 2.39 2.16a 
Kenya 2.29 2.48 
Ecuador 2.18 2.17 
Ethiopia 1.95 2.62 
Zaire 1.95 2.12 
Honduras 1.88 1.49a 
Peru 1.68 1.31a 
Nicaragua 1.59 1.28 
Papua New Guinea 1.48 1.16a 
Tanzania 1.48 1.36 
India 1.35 1.24a 
Dominican Rep. 1.10 0.95 
a = The nations voting against the successful proposal. 
b = The nations voting against the failed proposal. 
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80/81 Adjusted 
Failed Export Sharee 
Proposal (96) (96) 
30.00 27.80 
14.03b 16.30 
12.00 11.87 
4.75b 6.84 
5.24 4.30 
3.93 3.45 
4.16 3.31 
4.64 3.49 
2.24 2.76 
2.46b 2.13 
2.28 1.83 
2.42 2.52 
2.20 1.80 
1.62 1.80 
1.55 1.61 
1.53 1.49 
1.47b 1.52 
1.51 b 1.69 
o,99b 2.62 
1.00 0.87 
c =The adjusted export share is defined as the export share divided by 98.84 (i.e., the 
aggregate export share for ICO members). 
